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THE CHALLENGE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: U.S. AIR POWER IN THE NEXT DECADE

by

Alan J. Briding
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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Dr. Robert S. Jordan

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April 1993

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Challenge of Collective Action: U.S. Air Power in the Next Decade

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Two powerful new phenomena are shaping the way the U.S. military will be used in the next decade. The first is the trend in the emerging world order towards collective security and crisis response that will make use of limited objectives to pursue diplomatic goals. The second is the dramatic improvements that technology is bringing to the battlefield, to include the increase in survivability of air power platforms, and the accuracy with which they can deliver munitions. Limited-objective, multilateral operations will be the normal form of military application in the future, and air power will have inherent advantages that will make it the force of choice for these engagements. To ensure that the American military is fully prepared for this new style of warfare, national security policy makers will have to address the following key questions: when will forces be used, and under what priority of national and international interests; how will command and control of forces be maintained; and what policy, procedures, and planning must be accomplished to ensure interoperability in the combined operations arena?

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Alan J. Briding (M.S., Engineering Physics, Air Force Institute of Technology) has been interested in the United Nations since serving as a United Nations Truce Supervisor in the Middle East. He also has supported numerous humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts while performing aircrew duties as a C-141 pilot and squadron commander. He has traveled extensively as a crew member, and has served in the Air Staff in both the Operations and the Plans Directorates. Colonel Briding is a graduate of the Air Force Academy, Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air War College, class of 1993.

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INTRODUCTION

In his farewell address to the cadets at West Point on January 5th, 1993, President Bush stressed a theme he first introduced at the outset of the Gulf War--that the end of the Cold War has opened a new era of opportunity for the United States and the world:

> It is a time of great promise. Democratic governments have never been so numerous... the likelihood of nuclear holocaust is vastly diminished.
>
> But this does not mean that there is no specter of war, no threats to be reckoned with. And already, we see disturbing signs of what this new world could become if we are passive and aloof. We would risk the emergence of a world characterized by violence, characterized by chaos, one in which dictators and tyrants threaten their neighbors, build arsenals brimming with weapons of mass distruction, and ignore welfare of their own men, women and children... Our objective must be to exploit the unparalleled opportunity presented by the Cold War's end--to work towards transforming this new world into a new world order, one of governments that are democratic, tolerant, and economically free at home, and committed abroad to settling inevitable differences peacefully, without the threat or use of force. (10: 34-35)

President Bush's concept of a "new world order" formally ushered out the Cold War era, and has led to the extensive rebuilding of American foreign policy and the military strategy that supports it. For the first time in almost 30 years, there has been a fundamental change in U.S. military strategy. (47) National Military Strategy 1992 departed from a global threat-based security strategy driven by the potential for superpower confrontation, to a capabilities-based strategy aimed at meeting a wide range of potential regional threats.

A key shift in emphasis for both national and military strategy will be away from unilateralism toward multilateralism, accompanied by a growing interest in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations as actors on the international stage. We will see more formal and ad hoc coalitions conduct the full range of military options in the next decade, and U.S. air power will play a major role across the entire spectrum of these operations. The U.S. military must be fully prepared to engage in this important and demanding arena.

The political pervasiveness in military operations in the next decade makes it imperative that to be effective, Air Force decision makers understand not only the changing nature of contemporary military strategy, but also the nature of national security policy and the strategy that drives it. All of this will be played out against an unpredictable international landscape. This paper will analyze the security climate, policy agenda, and objectives formulated by the Bush administration, as well as the military strategy that has evolved from it, and then discuss how the Clinton administration's stated policies may affect this strategy. The paper then focuses on the emerging importance of the concept of collective security, discussing its potential capabilities, limitations, and broad implications for the military. Next, the paper considers how air power may play a major role in the politically constrained contingency operations that will be common in the next decade. It concludes with several observations to the effect that limited-objective coalition warfare is here to stay, and although our ability to wage conventional war against theater threats has been thoroughly planned and developed, we have far to go before we should feel comfortable with the prospect of conducting operations in multilateral low-intensity conflicts.

CHAPTER 1

U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY IN THE 1990s

Challenges and Opportunities in the Post-Cold War World

President Bush's remarks at West Point summarized the background position used to derive the operative assumptions leading to his administration's security strategy. These axioms, listed in the January 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States, are:

- The United States cannot be sure where the next conflict will arise.
- Regions critical to our interests must be defended.
- The world must respond to straightforward aggression.
- International coalitions can be forged, though they often will require American leadership.
- The proliferation of advanced weaponry represents a clear, present, and widespread danger.
- The United States remains the nation whose strength and leadership are essential to a stable and democratic world order

President Bush emphasized the foundation of this policy in the preface: "Our policy has one overriding goal: real peace. . . an enduring democratic peace based on shared values. Such a peace can only exist if it is based on the rule of law." (37: ii)

This document goes on to list the challenges facing America: politically, to help ensure the successful transition of the newly emerging democracies, especially in the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries; economically, to protect and expand international markets; and militarily, to confront regional instabilities when U.S. interests are at stake, or at the request of the United Nations or our allies, as well as to face the threats of proliferation, terrorism, and the international drug trade.

National Interests and Objectives

The security interests and objectives that evolve from this perspective are:

- Foremost, to ensure the security and freedom of the United States, and the protection of its values, institutions, and citizens.
- Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress.
- Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide.
- An open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants.
- An enduring global faith in America--that it can and will lead in a collective response to the world's crises.

The security strategy stresses the primacy of national security, "a sovereign responsibility which we will not abdicate to any other nation or collective organization." It also recognizes the importance of the "domestic imperative": building a strong economic and social foundation of national strength. The policy agenda, therefore, is predicated upon the importance of maintaining international influence, which in turn will be defined "more by the quality of our ideas, values, and leadership, and by our competitiveness in the international marketplace, than by the predominance of our military capabilities." It also puts collective engagement in perspective, recognizing and supporting the trend towards renewed effectiveness of multinational organizations such as the United Nations. (37: 2-6)

National Military Strategy

These national priorities lead to the new military strategy and its foundation built upon four key elements:

- Strategic deterrence and defense. Deterring nuclear attack is the top priority.
- Forward presence, to lend credibility to alliances, enhance regional stability, provide a crisis-response capability, and to maintain a system of collective defense.
- Crisis response, maintaining the capability to quickly project power.
- Reconstitution, maintaining the capability to rebuild a global warfighting capability if it should become necessary.

Several key concepts underwrite these elements. Collective response and the ability to conduct coalition operations are the preferred approach when time permits; technological superiority will continue to be of prime importance in maintaining superiority; and the U.S. must continue to stay engaged to prevent the emergence of a global threat or a regional power vacuum. (37: 13-15)

The January 1992 edition of National Military Strategy of the United States specifies four military objectives that indicate a strong policy of engagement:

- Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.
- Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic, and social progress.
- Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.
- Aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.

A caveat is given: "While we emphasize multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the capability to act unilaterally when and where U.S. interests dictate. This new strategy is, in many ways, more complex than the containment strategy of the Cold War era." (36: 5-6)

Realpolitik or Collective Security?

The preceding brief summary of current defense policy sets the stage for military planning for the next decade. The military should realize, however, that the course charted by President Bush and his national security strategy is a fundamental change in American policy, one that is still being debated on its merits, practicality, and implications for the future. President Bush's formal introduction of the concept of a new world order, presented in his address before a joint session of congress at the brink of the Gulf War, provided a catalyst for this debate on courses of foreign policy and the nature of the international environment after the end of bipolarism. (30: 13) At the

present, the trend towards collective security, with its attendant demands on the military, prevails--but there are other alternatives and new developments in the global structure that could derail this approach.

Now that the bipolar power structure and its attendant concept of nuclear deterrence has passed, collective security, also referred to as central coalition, concert of powers, or the liberalist school, is one of two foreign policy approaches vying for dominance in the emerging world order. The other is the realist, realpolitik, or balance of power school that emphasizes power as the prime motivator in international relations, and focuses on national interests as the guiding criteria for policy decisions. (38: 28; 44: 64) For this camp, order derives from a balanced distribution of power among the major actors. In contrast, collective security is based upon pursuing shared values, rather than organizing against specific threats as they arise. Order results from establishing broad concepts such as democracy, human rights, and international law, and the institutions such as the United Nations that sponsor these principles. (39: 84) The common threat that motivates collective security is transnational: It is that of global economic breakdown (44: 79) National interests still remain the prime factors in a state's policy--the goal of collective security is to harmonize national independence and global interdependence. (18: 3)

The U.N.-sponsored intervention in Somalia may be the first modern incidence since the Crusades of an invasion motivated by purely moral reasons. This would lend credence to the ascendancy of collective security, while posing the question of balance of idealism, sentimentality, and practicality that will ultimately limit moral endeavors in the future. (31)

Confluence of American Powers

America's status in the world today endows it with a unique opportunity to lead the world into an era of collective security. With the demise of the Soviet Union and with the success of Desert Storm, the United States is the only country in the world with

the full range of influence in the international arena. It is recognized as the only military superpower, while maintaining strong moral, cultural, political, and economic credibility. America has global interests, and enjoys special relationships with two of the economically most powerful states in the world: Japan and Germany. (49: 163; 37: 21) It has alliances in every region of the world, and has the means to project its power when it may be necessary. (14: 13) And perhaps most importantly, after the Gulf War, the American public shed the last vestiges of the "Vietnam syndrome" and has become more supportive of interventionist policy, particularly when it postures the United States as the guarantor of peace. (48: 397)

After the end of the Cold War, as after the end of World War I and World War II, America is in the key position to lead the world into an era based upon the ideals of collective security. There is a strong argument that the United States abdicated this role after WWI, a decision which was probably the most decisive factor in the dissolution of international order that led to WWII. (44: 75; 56; 57) Among the different schools of thought, whether realist or liberalist, isolationist or interventionist, pro-defense or reduced-defense, there does appear a common theme: There will be circumstances in which the United States should commit its military to achieve foreign policy objectives, but the method of preference will be via multilateral, not unilateral, action. (52, 28, 40, 46, 30) Whether the U.S. continues to take the lead after the Cold War, either to ensure its national interests or to champion a more idealistic agenda, there will always have to be a balance between the needs of the nation and the needs of the international community. The final arbiters that determine the long-term course of policy will be congress and the public--and how they want to commit their national resources. (48: 405)

In his article, "What New World Order," Joseph Nye sums up the prevailing view, reflected in much of the current literature on foreign affairs, adopted by the Bush administration:

> In short the new world order has begun. It is messy, evolving and not susceptible to simple formulation or manipulation... The United States will have to combine both traditional power and liberal institutional approaches if it is to pursue effectively its national interest... We will need to maintain our alliances and a balance of power in the short run, while simultaneously working to promote democratic values, human rights and institutions for the long run. To do less is to have only a fraction of foreign policy. (39: 96)

Policy on Use of Force

The Clinton administration is working on a comprehensive defense policy that is expected by the middle of the summer, and has already begun to take form publicly. (53) One policy of great importance to the military will be the conditions under which the use of force should be considered in support of national and collective security objectives.

Specific rules for the use of the military in foreign policy were emphasized by Caspar Weinberger, President Reagan's secretary of defense, for use in the 1980s. In his view, force should be used: (4: 21-22)

- Only in defense of vital interests.
- Only with support of the American people and Congress.
- Only as a last resort.
- Only with the clear intent of winning.
- Only when military objectives can clearly be defined.
- Only so long as the objectives were worth the risk.

President Bush had his own basic rules: Have a clear and achievable mission; a realistic plan; and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is complete. (10: 37)

General Colin Powell has stated that, as Clausewitz proposed, all wars are limited, and the use of force must always be secondary to the political objectives it serves:

> There is, however, no fixed set of rules for the use of military force. To set one up is dangerous... When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. (58: 37-38)

Although General Powell discards fixed rules in his statement, his National Military Strategy of the United States lists criteria for the appropriateness of committing U.S. forces: (36: 10, 15, 16)

- U.S. vital interests should be at risk.
- Political, diplomatic, and economic measures have failed or have been ruled out.
- Military objectives are clearly stated, measurable, and attainable.
- Decisive force can be marshalled to allow swift success with minimum loss of life.

Secretary of defense Les Aspin attributes these conditions to an officer corps consensus, and labels this position as the "all-or-nothing" school. Although he has not dismissed this view, Aspin has his reservations. He has stated that this "checklist" is intended to ensure public support, but that it does not fit the new challenges posed by current regional instabilities, and that public opinion is in favor of using force when these rules don't apply.

Secretary Aspin has offered a possible alternative, the "limited objectives" school. Its basic tenet is compellence: that military action, or its credible threat, may be used simply to send a signal to deter behavior. He points out that several developments make this an option for renewed consideration. The ascendancy of stealth and precision-guided munitions, as well as more sophisticated targeting, put an enemy's critical assets immediately at risk. And the fear of escalation when there are no firm guidelines for disengagement is less of a threat, now that there is no superpower confrontation that could drive up the military stakes, or force a tough stand for the sake of posturing. Secretary Aspin has gone on record as favoring the limited-objectives school, but has not closed the debate. (4: 21-26)

When to use force is also causing considerable debate in Congress, with little consensus, even along party lines. Liberal Democrats who objected to military intervention in the Cold War era and in the Persian Gulf have been strong advocates of using force in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while many Republicans are urging a much more cautious approach. As would be expected, President Clinton's approval of

airdrops over Bosnia brought both support and criticism, the latter focusing on the risks of limited open-ended objectives that many feel will lead to a commitment to escalate. (22: 529-530)

All of this illustrates the complexity of the security environment the United States will face in the coming decade and beyond. New policy is being formulated to meet both the new administration's domestic agenda and the challenges of the rapidly evolving international order. One observation is clear, however--international organizations such as the United Nations will become more prominent in building the new order, and have the potential to play a much greater role in determining when and how U.S. military forces will be engaged in maintaining international security.

CHAPTER II

COLLECTIVE SECURITY: CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

Ensuring the Peace: What Role for the United Nations?

In his report to the United Nations entitled "An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping," Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali focused the attention of the world on how the United Nations might play a primary role in providing international security and stability in the immediate future:

> With the end of the cold war . . . demands on the United Nations have surged. Its security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. Our aims must be:
>
> - To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;
> - Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;
> - Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;
> - To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
> - And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. (8: 203)

This agenda goes well beyond the roles of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance normally associated with the U.N.. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building, as envisioned by Dr. Boutros-Ghali, may all involve the use of armed forces, often in situations that might mandate offensive military action rather than strictly self-defensive measures that currently restrict peacekeeping forces.

Preventive diplomacy would include the option of preventive deployment of troops, either at the request of both countries involved in a dispute when they feel a U.N. presence would discourage hostilities, or when requested by a single country that feels threatened. If peaceful methods to resolve a potential conflict fail, the Security Council could invoke Chapter VII to send peacemaking forces to maintain or restore the peace. At the request of all the parties involved in a dispute, once hostilities cease, peacekeeping forces may be sent to stabilize the war zone. These forces are deployed primarily to maintain a presence and generally are authorized the use of force only in self-defense; these rules of engagement may become more relaxed in the future (9: 91). Post-conflict peace-building, although primarily a civil function, could employ armed forces to disarm the previously warring parties and to restore order, much in the manner of the American intervention in Somalia. (8: 204-213)

The Security Council has three options under Chapter VII to provide a peacemaking force. Articles 48 and 53 allow the U.N. to delegate enforcement on an ad hoc basis to member states or regional organizations respectively, as occurred in Korea and the Gulf War. (41: 100) Under Article 43, member states would make armed forces, facilities, and assistance available for this purpose on a permanent basis--in essence giving the Security Council a standing military force for peacemaking at its discretion. Dr. Boutros-Ghali concedes that such forces may never be large enough to deal with a major threat and will take time to build, but would have utility in many of the smaller conflicts that are springing up with such profusion. (8: 209-210) Under the provisions of Article 40, Dr. Boutros-Ghali would like to see the use of specifically trained peace-enforcement units available on an on-call basis from member states. These forces would be employed by the Security Council to ensure compliance with cease-fire agreements, and be heavily armed enough to give them the option to take coercive action if the parties violate the cease-fire. Peace-enforcement units would be separate from those which may be constituted to deal with acts of aggression under

Article 43, and from those in standby for possible peacekeeping operations. All of these peacemaking forces are intended to be under the command of the Secretary-General. (8: 210; 9: 93-94)

A final note should be made of Dr. Boutros-Ghali's request that member states should make airlift and sealift available to support U.N. operations, particularly peacekeeping, preferably free of cost or at rates lower than commercial fares. (8: 212)

U.S. Policy Towards the United Nations

In his address delivered to the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 1992, President Bush expressed support for an expanded U.N. agenda:

> I welcome the Secretary General's call for a new agenda to strengthen the United Nations' ability to prevent, contain and resolve conflict across the globe... I have directed the United States Secretary of Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping. Because of peacekeeping's growing importance as a mission for the United States military, we will emphasize training of combat, engineering and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. And we will work with the United Nations to employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping operations. (11: 3-4)

President Bush detailed the steps he felt were necessary from all members to achieve the proposed agenda: (11: 3)

- Nations should develop and train military units for possible peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief, available on short notice.
- Multinational units must train together and conduct field exercises together.
- Coordinated command-and-control and interoperability must be worked out.
- Nations must provide adequate logistical support for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
- Nations must develop planning and crisis management for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

Although the defense department has gone on record in support of collective security under the United Nations, the Bush administration left its options open by specifically limiting its strong endorsements to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. The higher risk proposition of peacemaking appears to have consciously

been avoided in its statements of support. National Security Strategy of the United States recommends that, "together with our allies and friends, the United States must develop multinational capabilities for enforcing peace, . . . as well as peace rebuilding after conflict." (37: 19) This statement allows much more flexibility to pursue peacemaking independent of the United Nations. Under Secretary Wolfowitz also qualified American support for collective action. Acknowledging the preference for multilateral action under the U.N., he went on to point out that the military and political contributions of the United States were the decisive elements in the success of the Gulf War, thus, "reliance on collective action, while an attractive option, will rarely be sufficient." Wolfowitz also felt that the potential for a Security Council member's veto on future issues will limit the Security Council's effectiveness, making the capacity for unilateral action necessary. (54: 49-50) Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, John R. Bolton, stressed the importance of the additional option of using regional organizations to take the lead, under U.N. auspices, in solving regional problems. (7: 53)

Congress has been ambivalent in its views of increased authority and power for the U.N. It does not want the United States to be put into the position of providing a global police force, but neither does it want to relinquish some of the national power that would come with transferring "the badge and the gun" to the U.N. Congress wants a more powerful U.N. to reduce America's burdens of building the post-Cold War world, but is at the same time concerned about related issues: (22: 525)

- How much authority in international affairs is the U.S. willing to give up?
- How much more will an expanded U.N. agenda cost the U.S.?
- How much can the U.N. be trusted with these responsibilities, particularly after it appeared to harbor an anti-U.S. attitude during the Cold War?
- Should the U.S. send soldiers to serve under U.N. command?

Both Congress and the new Clinton administration are attempting to work out policy on collective security and the U.N. Candidate Clinton was in favor of considering a standby U.N. rapid deployment force to deter aggression, but has not yet explicitly taken a position as president. Representative Aspin, during his confirmation hearing for secretary of defense, went on record as being against putting U.S. troops under the command of the U.N. for other than peacekeeping: "The president is commander in chief... Congress has war powers. And if you second these forces to the U.N., how do you maintain the Constitution? We couldn't be part of that option." Secretary of State Warren Christopher has stated that the U.N. requires more "robust" rules of engagement and should "recruit people who are willing to take more risk than they have in the past." (22: 526-529)

Challenges and Limitations Facing the United Nations

Concept of Sovereignty. The fragmentary forces of nationalism, anarchy, and religious and ethnic conflict are driving factors behind the increasing number of civil wars today. Although most of these are initially played out within the borders of a state, both the potential for a conflict spreading across national boundaries, and the often flagrant violation of basic international standards of humane conduct impose powerful motivations for intervention into otherwise sovereign affairs. Somalia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the prosecution of Kurds in Iraq are current examples of lawlessness and civil war that have demanded the attention and action of neighboring states and the international community. Three categories of collective action in the future may likely be directed at resolving issues previously held as sovereign and therefore out of bounds: humanitarian intervention on behalf of distressed peoples or populations; security intervention to prevent the use of weapons that threaten mass destruction, such as preemptive strikes against nuclear, chemical, and biological manufacturing plants or stockpiles; and environmental intervention, when a state's actions seriously affect the environmental health of the region. (30: 3)

Article 2 of the charter of the United Nations precludes intervention in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Generally, this limits actions that can be taken to those agreed to by the parties involved within the nation (40: 191-192) As the United Nations breaks new ground by placing international standards of behavior over the principle of sovereignty, as it has in Somalia, it will be faced with the necessity of carefully considering and codifying the circumstances under which it is willing to act. This may be the most urgent issue the U.N. faces if it wishes to legitimize a larger role in maintaining international security. (16: 24-25; 41: 98-99)

Effectiveness of the Security Council. Key to the success of the more aggressive security policy proposed by Dr. Boutros-Ghali will be the effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council in determining and controlling courses of action using military forces. Three issues most affect the ability of the Security Council to play a lead role in international security: how to revitalize the legitimacy of the council as being representative of the U.N. membership, how to overcome members' reluctance to entrust to it the command and control of multilateral operations, and how to prevent the gridlock that can be imposed by the veto power invested in the five permanent members.

The five permanent members--the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China--were determined according to the global power structure that existed as a consequence of World War II. As the power of Great Britain and France has waned, and other states such as Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, and Indonesia have grown in influence or have come to represent a greater proportion of the world's population, there is growing debate on who should sit as permanent members, whether they should maintain veto power, and how the Security Council might be restructured to reflect more accurately the interests of the rest of the U.N. membership. For example, Dr. Boutros-Ghali stated in his Agenda for Peace: "Never again must the Security Council lose the collegiality that is essential to its proper functioning, an attribute that it has

gained after such trial. A genuine consensus deriving from shared interests must govern its work, not the threat of the veto or the power of any group of nations." (8: 217)

There is no doubt that this will be a very contentious issue. None of the permanent members will willingly relinquish their positions, with accompanying veto power. Furthermore, the current membership is being viewed as being too susceptible to American influence: Great Britain and France are European allies, Russia is in desperate need of American and European aid, and China wishes to cooperate enough to ensure most-favored nation trading status with the U.S. The ease with which the United States was given U.N. approval to prosecute its own objectives in the Gulf War has added to the fear of the other U.N. members that the Security Council has become hostage to American foreign policy. (16: 22)

The other side of this issue is that any of the five permanent members can prevent Security Council resolutions with their veto, as happened so often during the Cold War. Both Russia and China are cooperating with Western initiatives in the council, but often with reluctance. The Soviets were uncomfortable with the latitude given the coalition forces in the Gulf War, preferring narrower interpretations of U.N. resolutions. The Russians may be less willing to cooperate completely in the future, even if their government survives as a democratic institution with a favorable view of the West. (46: 77; 55; 3)

Command and Control of Military Operations. The U.N. charter established the Military Staff Committee as the advisory body to the Security Council for military matters. The committee is comprised of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent Security Council members. (46: 73) Working together, the Security Council and Military Staff Committee are intended to plan, authorize, and direct military operations under the U.N. aegis. Command of U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking forces is to be retained by the Secretary-General. (8: 210)

There are obvious obstacles to the functioning of these provisions. Only in circumstances of very limited scope would the diverse nature of the Military Staff Committee allow it to agree upon and coordinate planning and control of a military campaign. It would be even more difficult to get agreement on strategic guidance from the fifteen-member Security Council. (40: 191) And the member nations that provide combat troops and equipment would be very hesitant to place control in the hands of the council and Military Staff Committee for other than peacekeeping operations. (41: 101) Korea and the Gulf War illustrate the point. In each conflict, the Security Council had little control over the course of events once its resolutions were passed, and the Military Staff Committee played no part in the campaign planning or the control of the coalition forces. (46: 73; 12: 10)

Building even a division-sized standing U.N. force vested with rapid reaction capability will also be very difficult. Such a force is envisioned to be put quickly in place to stabilize incipient hostilities or a tenuous cease-fire, and might be instrumental in preventing the need for larger-scale intervention later. (16: 23; 33: 218) Again, although the concept has considerable merit, the practicalities may be extremely difficult to overcome. First, the nature of the mission would demand that the forces garrison and train together. This would require a host country, with appropriate facilities available for basing and deployment. Although these costs could be defrayed by the U.N., this would effectively limit the host nation to one of the major powers. Second, equipment, doctrine and tactics would have to be compatible, again limiting the participating forces unless standards of interoperability were established and equipment purchase and modification were funded by the U.N. (16: 23; 33: 221) Third, Chapter VII, article 43 of the U.N. charter does not specify command arrangements. (41: 99-100) This leaves the chain of command below the Secretary-General open to negotiation. One solution would be to include component commanders from those countries providing the bulk of combat forces, with the responsibility for operational

control of their nation's forces. This type of partitioning would have its obvious disadvantages when several nations contribute significant numbers of troops.

There are other problems such as bureaucratic reform and financing that must be solved before the U.N. will be able to achieve Dr. Boutros-Ghali's optimistic agenda. Most U.N. observers anticipate some improvement in its effectiveness, and an expansion, although limited, of its role in addressing security issues. (28: 84; 40: 195; 18: 17-19) Even so, the United States will find that the context for determining when and how to use force is undergoing profound change: not only will fewer problems lend themselves to military solution, but also for political and financial reasons, when force is necessary, it will be much more preferable to use it under the sponsorship of the U.N. The alternative, when the United Nations cannot or will not act, will be regional alliances and unilateral actions. (41: 94, 97)

CHAPTER III

IMPLICATIONS FOR AIR POWER

"For a service to remain relevant to the future national security needs, there are two absolute requirements: It must possess utility across the spectrum of security operations, and it must be capable of functioning in the joint and combined arenas." (35: 41)

Although these words were written by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, they serve well to set the stage for consideration by any service as it adjusts to the new security environment. The defense strategy makes it clear that the military must first ensure its ability to deter the nuclear threat and to meet the challenge of regional conventional warfare. Yet the most likely use of the military in the next decade will be in limited-objective unilateral or multilateral operations.

Limited-Objective Operations

Mention limited objectives, and most officers cringe with thoughts of Vietnam running through their minds. It was primarily due to the distaste for the ambiguity of defense policy, and the resultant lack of clear-cut military objectives during this war, that the "all-or-nothing" school of force application came about. As Secretary Aspin points out, however, the new capabilities brought by precision guided munitions and sophisticated targeting, as well as the trend towards collective response, may invalidate this doctrine. The brewing crises in locations such as Bosnia would indicate that action may be mandated for situations where military objectives may not easily be determined.

Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume II opens with an essay on the nature of war that puts the political primacy that motivates military operations back into perspective.

Quoting extensively from Clausewitz, several points are made: that war is "a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means"; and that "the original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely *since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences*" (emphasis by Clausewitz). (2: v, xiii) Although the military officer may prefer the focus that an unambiguous conventional war offers, the legitimate use of force is heading towards more nebulous realms.

AFM 1-1 lists its own recommendations for the proper use of force: national interests and political objectives should be clearly understood; meaningful, attainable, and measurable military objectives should be derived from them; the means must be at hand; and the objectives must be worth the cost of war. Any rational policy must be based upon the limitations of military power. And if the U.S. is to avoid repeating its failure in Vietnam, it will also be critical to "frame political and strategic objectives compatible with U.S. national character and the nature of the enemy." (2: vi, 2)

Essay G in AFM 1-1, Volume II discusses low-intensity conflict (LIC), the category in which it places contingency operations. AFM 1-1 recognizes the complexity of these operations, framed by the numerous restraints imposed by their highly political tone, and acknowledges that they require their own strategy, operational art, tactics, and force structure. (2: 52, 57-58) The implication throughout all of this is that limited operations will place a premium on fresh thinking, innovation, and a keen sense of the underlying political objectives.

Collective Action: Air Power as the Weapon of Choice

The fundamental principle behind the Air Force concept of "Global Reach--Global Power" is that the Air Force "can deter, provide a presence, or put ordnance on a target anywhere in the world in a matter of hours." (27: 5) The inherent characteristics of air power, speed, flexibility, range, and versatility, lend themselves to limited operations, and allow the exploitation of mass and maneuver to a greater extent than surface forces.

Air power can attack any of the enemy's assets, at any time, in pursuit of objectives from the strategic level down through the tactical level. (23:11-12; 1: 5) This versatility will make air power a very capable option to accomplish military objectives when political considerations constrain the application of force. The key difference from conventional warfare is that in most cases, the political objectives will be served by exerting a compelling influence that will generally stop short of having to control the ground.

Air power has another important advantage when it is used in limited operations: It is much less of a political risk at home, and less of a threat to the sovereignty of the enemy, than the introduction of ground forces. President Clinton has raised the level of commitment in Bosnia from airland and airdrop missions to enforcing the no-fly zone, but is still very reluctant to discuss sending in U.S. troops with NATO peacekeepers or peacemakers. (20, 21, 19) Air strikes can be used to restrict an enemy's capabilities, to coerce by punishment, or to destroy the effectiveness of the leadership, as was done in the Gulf War. Yet Saddam Hussein did not resort to measures of desperation such as using chemical or biological weapons, perhaps because he felt he could stay in power as long as ground forces did not approach Baghdad, even while it was routinely under bombardment from the air.

The Persian Gulf was the proving ground for the new generation of weapons, systems that were based on the premise that high performance lessened risk and was the best way to ensure better dependability in combat performance. (25: 6) Whatever doubts both the supporters and detractors of this philosophy had with the capabilities of modern weapons were almost universally dispelled. The overwhelming consensus was that "high tech works... U.S. forces accomplished what they set out to do... the performance of U.S. equipment and forces in Operation Desert Storm exceeded even the most optimistic expectations." (5: 16-17)

The Gulf War graphically demonstrated one other key advantage to using air power in limited operations: the accuracy with which munitions hit their targets. Target sets may be singled out among civilian surroundings and attacked with minimal collateral damage and loss of civilian life (or combatant lives, if that is part of the objective). (5: 7)

Strike Capability: Precision, Survivability, and Sophistication

The lethality and effectiveness of air power has entered a new era with the advent of precision guided munitions, stealth, and force enhancement systems. Not only can air power put the entire range of enemy target sets at risk--it can deliver the killing blow with immediacy and pinpoint accuracy, day or night, with minimum risk to friendly forces.

Precision Delivery. In World War II, strategic bombing required massive heavy bomber formations in multiple raids to knock out a target complex. In Desert Storm, an F-117 in a single pass could demolish a strategic target with its "air-shaft accuracy" laser-guided bombs. This lethality has reintroduced the feasibility and efficiency of conducting strategic air campaigns on any scale. (1: 12) It has also greatly reduced collateral damage, and allows targeting that minimizes long-term disruption to society. Targets such as oil refineries and electrical generation plants can be disabled, rather than demolished. (5: 8)

The quantum leap in strike effectiveness of guided munitions over "dumb bombs" has also given new meaning to the concepts of mass and economy of force. The F-117 brings close to a one-target, one-round capability to the battlefield. Other precision munitions such as the Maverick air-to-ground missiles were very deadly against individual Iraqi tanks, particularly when technology and innovation combined to make "tank plinking" in the Gulf War so effective. (5: 10-11; 34: 174) Such accuracy makes air attack extremely versatile. Even countries that do not have a significant industrial base will likely have vulnerable leadership and economic targets that they value, and

therefore will be susceptible to coercion. (1: 12) The challenge here for the immediate future will be to develop new concepts of targeting that span the range of strategic to tactical objectives in both industrialized and non-industrialized nations, and that find ways to compel non-state actors such as terrorist groups and drugs cartels. (23: 7-8)

Delivery systems will be coupled with a new generation of smart weapons and force enhancement capabilities in the coming decade to further increase the effectiveness of interdiction and close air support. All-weather, anti-tank and anti-personnel sensor-fused munitions will make the battlefield inoperable for forces that have lost air superiority. All-weather navigation and targeting systems and night-vision goggles allowed coalition forces to attack at night and, to a limited degree, in weather during Desert Storm. The tremendous advantage this gave the coalition puts improving all-weather capability throughout the strike fleet as a top priority. (34: 176; 6: 64)

Survivability. When the ability to deliver bombs precisely on target is matched with the ability to avoid enemy threats and survive the modern battlefield, the result will be a weapons platform superbly fit for the entire mission spectrum that U.S. forces will face in the future. In the Gulf War, the world's first operational stealth aircraft, the F-117, flew more than 1200 sorties over Baghdad, operating without any escort. It was the only strike aircraft to fly over Baghdad due to the threat posed by the city's extensive air defense system. Although they comprised only 3 percent of the air assets, F-117s struck over 30 percent of the targets attacked in the first two days of the war--yet none were lost. (34: 173; 5: 19)

Survival for the rest of the strike aircraft was greatly improved by force enhancements and force multipliers such as defense suppression, stand-off capability, and the use of remotely piloted vehicles. Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) was a prime objective during the air campaign, and allowed otherwise vulnerable aircraft like the A-10 and F-16 to operate at standoff distances above the anti-aircraft artillery and heat-seeking surface-to-air missile threat. Also, terrain-following tactical cruise

missiles like the Navy's Tomahawk missile greatly increased the attack options for heavily-defended targets. (5: xx, 18) The next priority for improving survivability will be to develop systems and tactics that will defeat the anti-aircraft artillery threat, making low-level attack profiles lower-risk options. ((34: 177)

The potential applications for survivable weapons systems with precision delivery have not been overlooked by the analysts looking for solutions to today's limited conflicts. Whether the proposed objectives in a crisis such as Bosnia are to maintain air supremacy, destroy Serbian artillery, or attack Serbian infrastructure and command and communication nodes, air power is consistently the force of choice. (32; 20)

Integrated Battlefield. The doctrine of American forces stresses the multiplier effect of technology, in essence using technological advantage and innovation to compensate for the fewer numbers of troops and equipment policy makers wish to maintain or to put in harm's way. (25: 6) As a result, the military has developed synergies by linking new technologies, gaining even more advantage over comparably equipped but less sophisticated forces. *Desert Storm* again clearly demonstrated the leverage gained over the opponent when sensor complexes provide real-time assessment of battlefield conditions and enemy movement, communications link the sensors to command centers and combat units, and weapons systems armed with smart munitions are poised to close the cycle with their lethal strikes. (25: 3; 45: 25-27) Integrated reconnaissance-strike complexes such as this, when installed to monitor and control enemy operations under the constraints of limited objectives, could prove to be very effective at suppressing an enemy that may otherwise be widely dispersed and difficult to find, isolate and attack.

Disabling Systems. Disabling systems are defined as systems that are not intended to inflict casualties or to cause large-scale property damage. When coupled with precision delivery munitions, these weapons have the potential to make the next

conflict radically different. Examples of possible disabling systems include:

- directed energy against radar systems, computer nets, and C^3I
- acoustic projection for deception, disorientation, and incapacitation
- bioengineering of organisms that degrade propellants, explosives, and seals
- microrobotics to incapacitate electronic systems
- computer viruses
- materials that deteriorate pavement

In a limited conflict, disabling systems would offer a line of compellence options prior to initiating more direct uses of force, and could augment operations throughout any level of operations. This option would have the double benefit of being more politically tolerable due to its relative humaneness, while easing post-conflict recovery of the target sets attacked. (17: 45-49) One of the proposals for compelling the Serbs to come to terms in Bosnia advocates the use of disabling systems in the form of carbon-fiber strands dropped on Serbian power grids to render them inoperative, and introducing additives into petroleum products in refineries and storage tanks that would reduce them to useless jelly. (32)

Air Mobility: Providing the Crisis Response

Operations Tempo. If you were to ask an airlifter or tanker crew how their role might change as the Air Force adapts to the post-Cold War era, they most likely would not anticipate new missions as much as increased tempo of operations (optempo). For the airlift and tanker community, there has been little change in its support of humanitarian and disaster-relief missions since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Air Mobility Command (AMC) mission is to "supply rapid global mobility", one of the five principles that provide the foundation for the concept of "Global Reach--Global Power." (27: 3) AMC has been deeply involved in both supporting U.S. and allied forces worldwide, as well as providing essential support for the U.N. and other international organizations.

As an instrument of American influence, the AMC has established a worldwide presence. From August to November, 1992, the command flew over 6000 sorties in support of Operations Provide Promise (airdrops over Bosnia), Provide Hope (aid to Russia), Provide Comfort (relief for Iraqi kurds), Provide Relief (Horn of Africa), and disaster relief due to Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Iniki, and Typhoon Omar. (27: 9) During the same general period, airlift aircraft were landing on an average of every three minutes somewhere in the world, generating an optempo that approached the airlift pace during the height of Desert Storm. (26) Many of these and other recent airlifts were in direct support of U.N. and other multilateral actions.

Although Russia has a significant strategic airlift capability, its internal problems have severely limited its ability to aid the U.N. or other organizations. The proven willingness and capability of the U.S. to provide airlift have made America the de facto source of lift for most humanitarian aid and disaster relief--a task that appears only to be growing, promising an increase in optempo for the future. (51: 5; 13: xx) Contributing airlift support will pose a useful option for the U.S. when there is good reason to assist in a multilateral effort, and the administration, Congress, or the public is unwilling to supply forces that could get directly into harm's way. (41: 99-100) As American airlift is so essential to most coalition operations, it also gives the U.S. an informal veto power over whether a given operation will actually occur.

Airlift Requirements. Two recent assessments have analyzed the airlift and sealift requirements to support the defense strategy. The Joint Military Net Assessment matched current and proposed force levels with non-predictive but realistic scenarios for regional crises, to determine if the force structure would be able to accomplish combat, support, and mobility missions. (51) The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) looked specifically at the lift required to meet the national military strategy using the proposed Base Force, analyzing individual regional deployments and two concurrent

regional contingencies that begin sequentially. As part of the Base Force, a projected buy of 120 C-17s was assumed. (42: 51, 52)

Both studies concluded that crisis response and regional war orientation put strong emphasis on strategic mobility. Both also found that the full buy of 120 C-17s would be critical to have the flexibility to make up for decreased overseas basing and short or unimproved airstrips, particularly in many of the lesser regional contingencies that were analyzed, as well as to meet airlift requirements as the C-141 fleet retired. (42: 53-54; 6: 20)

The MRS recommended an airlift capacity of 57 million ton-miles per day by 1999, which would break down into 37 million ton-miles provided by military aircraft, the remainder coming from Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft. This dependence on the CRAF, although successful in the Gulf War, may limit operations in the future as civilian fleets may become more reluctant to participate and may be more influenced by economic forces. Desert Shield operations went into some of the best airports in the world, with very little risk of attack. It also took place during a period of low demand in the civilian sector. (29: 12)

New Challenges for Coalition Warfare

Interoperability. The biggest challenge in coalition warfare will be in obtaining agreement on procedures both on and off the battlefield for conducting operations. To handle this, the U.S. military must resolve several issues, among them: how multilateral command and operational control will work, and under what circumstances it will be willing to give command and control to officers of other nationalities; how war plans will be built and how military objectives will be determined under combined command, working for non-military agencies; how incompatible tactics and doctrine will be resolved; and how classified intelligence will be shared with coalition partners. The other side of interoperability is taking the necessary measures to make the various kinds of equipment used by coalition partners compatible.

It was discussed previously that the Clinton administration would be reluctant to relinquish command of U.S. troops to other countries or organizations. The implication is that whenever American forces participate in coalitions, an American will have either overall command or component command of U.S. forces. This sets a precedent for other countries to follow, one that has the potential to lead to a highly fragmented command relationship that could cripple the effectiveness of the coalition if not thought through. In Aspin's opinion, this type of fragmentation of command led to the Marine barracks disaster in Beirut. (5: 5)

One way to reduce this problem would be to partition coalition forces along easily divisible mission lines. As an example, each country could provide units capable of independent operations that can simply be parceled a portion of responsibility for the campaign, or given specific military objectives they can achieve by themselves. The U.S. would then have greater opportunity to use the assets in which it dominates: strike, air superiority, SEAD, C^3, recce, and airlift aircraft; space platforms; naval power; and small, low-profile elite or unique ground units such as special forces. Each of these brings great advantage to the coalition, and avoids the political commitment of introducing a large contingent of ground troops. Providing the ground forces would also demonstrate the commitment of the region's allies, as well as minimizing the intertheater lift requirement.

Interoperability of equipment has plagued not only ad hoc coalitions, but also long-standing ones such as the NATO forces, not to mention the separate American military services. (5: xxi, xxvi) This is a problem that will most likely be managed rather than solved, as different manufacturers continue to enter and leave the arms market. Critical show-stoppers such as incompatible communications equipment must be identified in advance, so that work-around provisions can be anticipated. Once again, innovation will be the key--but it should not be an excuse to ignore looking at the problem in depth, beforehand.

Combined Doctrine. The recent emphasis in the Air Force on rebuilding its doctrinal foundation has given the service a new mission statement as well as an in-depth, updated review of basic doctrine as presented and analyzed in the new AFM 1-1 volumes. The air campaign of Desert Storm has stimulated fresh debate about the role of air power and what its capabilities are. The result is new interest in the theoretical side of conducting the air war, but the bulk of contemporary thought has been directed towards conventional warfare, not limited operations. Air Force pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, is the source document for this regime. It discusses peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations, with peacemaking, strikes, and raids falling under the latter category. The manual warns of the difficulties of peacemaking, listing the requirements for:

- Consistent mission analysis.
- Clear command and control relationships.
- Effective communications facilities.
- Joint and combined force liaison.
- Effective public diplomacy and PSYOP.

Although the pamphlet discusses many of these aspects, it does so from the framework of unilateral or joint operations--on the much more difficult realm of combined operations, it is silent. (24)

The joint document for contingency operations is Test Pub Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. It gives greater background and depth to operational procedures and relationships, and points out the importance of coordinating planning with civilian agencies and host nations involved, as well as emphasizing the importance of blending the military element with the other elements of national influence. Once again, though, the document is written to satisfy joint operations that are unilateral or hosted by another nation, and gives no specific procedure for planning, coordinating, conducting, and assessing a combined operation. (50)

Joint Pub 3-07 does an excellent job, however, of capturing the unique demands of contingency operations that will characterize collective action in the coming decade:

> An essential consideration for the military commander or planner involved in LIC is an understanding, regardless of the nature and extent of military involvement, of the parameters that spell success, failure, or conflict termination. Only by understanding U.S. policy, goals, and considerations can the military commander or planner hope to integrate his efforts with those of other engaged agencies. The paradox inherent in LIC is that such policy is often developmental and contingent on the results of preceding actions. As such, military planning for the LIC environment must, of necessity, be an open-ended and interactive process that is adaptive to the political and policy drivers of the U.S. government and its foreign policy at any stage of the process. (50: I-11)

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The experience of the American military over the previous decades has prepared it well both for the nuclear deterrence mission and for the conduct of conventional warfare. The Gulf War marked the start of a new era for the military, however, as it demonstrated the impact of two powerful new phenomena: the trend towards collective security and coalition warfare, and the revolutionary capabilities brought to the battlefield by the latest products of high technology. The conflicts of the next decade will more likely be limited operations conducted by combined forces that selectively employ sophisticated weapons systems, rather than set-piece conventional wars like Desert Storm. And neither the American government nor military have developed the concepts, policy, or doctrine that will be needed to ensure effective operation in this new environment.

The Potential for Collective Security

Several conclusions may be drawn from the previous chapters. The first is that collective security issues will continue to compete with national priorities in the formulation of national security strategy for the remainder of the decade. Collective security will be afforded greater priority in the United States if the domestic economy improves and if the international community and its structure coalesce around the concept of collective security and its focal point, the United Nations. Yet there will be a practical limit imposed fairly quickly, as both American and other national budgets drive a balance between idealism and pragmatism. The U.N. will make only modest progress in achieving Dr. Boutros-Ghali's progressive agenda, and neither the U.S. nor, for that matter, the U.N. will be able to handle all of the international contingencies that

will arise. Those that are addressed will be prioritized according to "political triage" emphasizing vital national interests, then interests that are more global in nature, attempting to combine these priorities whenever possible.

Within this context, limited military operations will become the norm in consideration of the use of force. New standards for determining when and how force should be applied will evolve as political and military strategies and objectives become more closely intertwined and interactive. The next decade will be a time when fresh thinking will be necessary to produce the innovation and insight the military will need to continue its transition from a cold war force to one ready to face a new world order.

Our national security policy makers will have to decide how to answer several key questions:

- When will the U.S. defer to international and regional viewpoints, and when will it pursue policy unilaterally? How does the U.S. ensure it is not pursuing incompatible objectives? Does it have a comprehensive hierarchy of goals?
- Will the U.S. construct a policy for working with the United Nations, or will it assess each issue on an ad hoc basis?
- Under what circumstances will the use of force be considered?
- How and when will force be used against transnational and non-state actors?
- Under what circumstances will U.S. forces be placed under formal command or operational control of foreign officers?
- How will the U.S. ensure that standards for the employment of its military are met during collective action operations?

<u>The Preference for Air Power</u>

The inherent characteristics of air power will make it the force of preference for most limited operations.

- It is quickly deployable and requires less sealift and airlift than ground forces.
- Using air power is not as politically dangerous as introducing ground forces.

- its survivability will limit the risk normally inherent in force applications.
- It will immediately be able to strike at the full range of targets, offering the capability for quick compellence in support of political objectives.
- Its ability to deliver precision munitions will limit collateral damage and decrease the time to rebuild target sets.
- Disabling systems delivered by air will introduce a new class of warfare that lends itself especially well to the politically-imposed restrictions of limited operations.
- Air power assets will be easier to keep under U.S. command and control than ground forces that operate in close coordination with other states' ground forces.
- Strategic airlift will become increasingly important as it continues to support the U.S., allies, and the U.N.

Doctrine for Combined Operations

Now that the services are adjusting to the concept and requirements of joint operations, it is time to expand our thinking as to how we will conduct combined operations. Most combined operations in the future will not allow the time we had in the Gulf War to build a workable coalition and the associated procedures for command and control, interoperability, and employment of forces. A generic groundwork for combined operations should be developed, so that future contingencies only require that task force commanders tailor the procedures to fit the circumstances, not that they build the procedures from scratch.

The American military must be careful in applying the lessons of history to this new environment. Its decision makers will have to discard many of the generalized abstractions that were useful in the static conditions of the Cold War, and approach the use of air power in the 1990s with the same flexibility and innovation of the original air power pioneers.

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